This paper uses panel econometric techniques to estimate a macro-financial model for fee and commission income over total assets for a broad sample of euro area banks. Using the estimated parameters, it conducts a scenario analysis projecting the fee and commission income ratio over a three years horizon conditional on the baseline and adverse macroeconomic scenarios used in the 2016 EU-wide stress test. The results indicate that the fee and commission income ratio is varying in particular with changes in its own lag, the shortterm interest rate, stock market returns and real GDP growth. They also show that the fee and commission income ratio projections are more conservative under the adverse scenario than under the baseline scenario. These findings suggest that stress tests assuming scenario-independent fee and commission income projections are likely to be flawed.
Non-Technical Summary
The recent financial and sovereign debt crises highlighted the importance for economic activity of having sound banks able to withstand extreme and unexpected shocks to their balance sheets and able to generate sufficient income even in times of distress. Indeed, banks resilient to stress and able to act as effective financial intermediaries over the economic cycle are a necessary condition for ensuring a smooth flow of credit to the real economy also in periods of economic turbulence. With the aim of ensuring a well-functioning financial system to support economic growth, macro stress-testing frameworks are often used to assess in a forward-looking manner the resilience of the banking sector to (adverse) macroeconomic and financial developments.
The main purpose of macro stress testing is to assess the sensitivity to adverse macroeconomic and financial developments of individual banks' balance sheet and profits and losses.
While most stress testing tools typically have well-developed modules for projecting loan losses and net interest income, other sources of income and expenses are often only modelled in a rudimentary fashion. This ignores that other parts of banks' net income may be also related to macroeconomic and financial developments. In other words, these stress testing approaches may risk overlooking key elements of banks' income generating activities, such as income from fees and commissions which together with net interest income and net trading income are the three most important income sources for most banks. In fact, fees and commissions constitute on average between 22% and 30% of euro area banks' net revenue and about two thirds of euro area banks' total non-interest income. Therefore, stress tests that ignore the sensitivity to macroeconomic conditions of such an important income source may potentially underestimate the volatility of banks' solvency position when exposed to stress events.
Against this background, this paper proposes a model for estimating the relationship between some key macroeconomic and financial factors and fee and commission income over assets, using yearly data between 1995 and 2015 for a large sample of euro area banks. Then, it shows how the estimated model can be applied to stress test the resilience of this source of revenue conditional on the baseline and adverse macroeconomic scenarios used in the 2016 EU-wide stress test.
More specifically, the empirical strategy adopted in this paper begins with the selection, out of a predetermined group of macroeconomic and financial factors, of the independent variables that have the most explanatory power for fee and commission over assets, our variable of interest.
This selection approach yields as the most relevant drivers the lag of fee and commission income over total assets, the lag of the first difference of the short term interest rate, the stock market returns (both the lagged and the contemporaneous variable), the lag of the first difference of the long term interest rate, residential property price growth and the real GDP growth. In a second step, a model for fees and commissions over assets including the selected regressors is estimated.
The results show that lagged fee and commission income over assets, the contemporaneous stock market returns and real GDP growth are positively and significantly related to fees and commissions over assets, while the first difference of the short term interest rate is negatively and significantly associated to our variable of interest. Finally, this study provides a scenario analysis ECB Working Paper 2029, February 2017which highlights the usefulness of the estimated model in a stress-testing context. Indeed, the estimated parameters are used to project fee and commission income over assets over a three year horizon conditional on both a baseline and an adverse macroeconomic scenario. This scenario analysis illustrates how fees and commissions over assets, aggregated at country level for 18 euro area countries, are sensitive to the different macroeconomic developments. Indeed, the resulting fees and commissions projections are considerably more conservative under the adverse scenario than under the baseline scenario.
This paper contributes to the existing limited literature on the topic in several ways. First, combining bank-level and macroeconomic data, it studies the determinants of fees and commissions as a ratio of total assets at the international level while most of the related studies have investigated this issue at the country level. The international analysis is useful as provides for a larger size of the panel and it allows for assessing country-specific differences in fee and commission income dynamics. Second, it relies on a sound statistical technique to select, out of a predetermined set of macroeconomic and financial factors, the determinants of fees and commissions over assets to be included in the benchmark model. The application of this selec-
Introduction
The recent financial and sovereign debt crises highlighted the importance for economic activity of having sound banks able to withstand extreme and unexpected shocks to their balance sheets and able to generate sufficient income even in times of distress. Indeed, banks resilient to stress and able to act as effective financial intermediaries over the economic cycle are a necessary condition for ensuring a smooth flow of credit to the real economy also in periods of economic turbulence. With the aim of ensuring a well-functioning financial system to support economic growth, macro stress-testing frameworks are often used to assess in a forward-looking manner the resilience of the banking sector to (adverse) macroeconomic and financial developments, see e.g. the studies by Henry and Kok (2013) outlining the European Central Bank (ECB) top-down stress testing framework and by Borio, Drehmann and Tsatsaronis (2014) discussing strength and weaknesses of macro stress testing in general.
The main purpose of macro stress testing is to assess the sensitivity to adverse macroeconomic and financial developments of individual banks' balance sheets and profits and losses.
The topic has received substantial attention in recent years and sophisticated methods have been developed to provide sufficiently robust and conservative model predictions; see e.g. Gross and Población (2015) who promote the use of Bayesian model averaging. While most stress testing tools typically have well-developed modules for projecting loan losses and net interest income, other sources of income and expenses are typically only modelled in a rudimentary fashion. This ignores that other parts of banks' net income may be also related to macroeconomic and financial developments. In other words, these stress testing approaches may risk overlooking key elements of banks' income generating activities, such as income from fees and commissions which together with net interest income and net trading income are the three most important income sources for most banks. In fact, fees and commissions constitute on average between 25% and 30% of euro area banks' total income and about two thirds of euro area banks' total non-interest income. Therefore, stress tests that ignore the sensitivity to macroeconomic conditions of such an important income source may potentially underestimate the volatility of banks' solvency position when exposed to stress events.
Against this background, this paper proposes a model for estimating the relationship between some key macroeconomic and financial factors and fee and commission income over assets, using yearly data between 1995 and 2015 for a large sample of euro area banks. Then, it shows how the estimated model can be applied to stress test the resilience of this source of revenue under both a baseline and an adverse macroeconomic scenario.
While substantial research efforts have been directed at modelling banks' balance sheets and at forecasting loan losses and net interest income components, only few studies have focused on fee and commission income despite its significance as the second most important source of revenue for the majority of European banks. Perhaps owing to the scarcity of empirical studies on the determinants of fees and commissions and to the fact that fee and commission income tends to be less volatile than the other main streams of bank revenue (e.g. net interest income), ECB Working Paper 2029, February 2017this income component is often assumed to be stable in forward-looking analyses such as stress tests. However, this assumption may often end up being over-simplistic because a relative stability may not necessarily imply an absence of cyclical fluctuations. In fact, notwithstanding the limited relative volatility, fee and commission income has proven to exhibit pronounced cyclical tendencies in some cases. Fee and commission income of euro area significant banking groups has generally tended to correlate strongly with net interest income over the last few years. 1 This seems to suggest that both sources of income are driven by some common underlying factors, such as broad macroeconomic activity and retail customer business activities. 2 Activities of a cyclical nature probably relate to economic and financial market activities, such as financial services (including those to retail customers), securities and loan underwriting, advisory services related to mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and securities brokerage business. However, also more structural factors, such as payment transactions, safe custody administration and bank competition, are likely to be important determinants of overall fee and commission income. By contrast, the movement of fee and commission income in relation to trading income has been more heterogeneous across banks in the significant banking groups sample. 3
The empirical literature aiming to measure the cyclical variation in non-interest income subcomponents was pioneered by Saunders and Walter (1994) and Kwan and Laderman (1999) .
These studies find that fee and commission activities provide stability to banks' income contrary to trading activities. ECB (2000) finds similar results for EU banks but it goes one step further by making a distinction, within fee and commission income, between the so called traditional fee-generating banking activities and more market-related businesses in which banks expanded heavily in recent decades (e.g. brokerage, M&A, underwriting). Fee and commission income from traditional banking appears to be less subject to cyclical variations compared to that generated by recent activities. Smith net interest income, fees and commissions and trading income, and then assess the sensitivity of these sources of income to macroeconomic and financial developments, stress testing their resilience to several scenarios. As regards the main drivers of fee and commission income, using a dynamic panel approach, Coffinet et al. (2009) show that GDP growth, stock market returns and expenditures over total assets exhibit a positive and significant relationship while the ratio of loan loss provisions over total loans (a measure of banks' risk taking) is negatively related to this source of income. The study also shows that lagged trading income has a positive impact on current fee and commission income. Finally, the authors somewhat surprisingly find that fees and commissions are more sensitive to adverse macroeconomic developments than interest income.
In a related study, Lehmann and Manz (2006) context, using publicly available data, they show that non-trading non-interest income over total assets exhibit a positive significant relationship with its own lag, stock market returns and the share of credit card loans over interest earning assets while it exhibits a negative and significant relationship with the share of commercial real estate loans over interest earning assets and the share of the banks assets over the total industrys assets.
Covas, Rump and Zakrajsek (2014) propose a fixed-effect quantile autoregressive approach to study the effects of adverse macroeconomic scenarios on the capital positions of the 15 largest US banks. Using publicly available quarterly data from 1997 to 2011, they find that non-trading non-interest income over consolidated assets is positively and significantly associated with its own lags while it is negatively and significantly related to three-month Treasury yield and to corporate bond credit spreads. find that well-managed banks, measured by a high relative return on equity (ROE), rely less on non-interest income while large banks and banks that focus more on relationship banking are more reliant on non-interest income. Moreover, they show that an increase in non-interest income is related to higher and more volatile profits and an overall worsening of the risk-return trade-off for the average commercial bank during the considered sample period.
Busch and Kick (2009) study the determinants of non-interest income and the impact of this income source on the performance of German banks between 1995 and 2007 using yearly supervisory data. Their work shows that banks relying more on traditional banking relationships, holding a higher amount of equity over assets and having a higher service intensity are more concentrated in the fees and commissions business. Furthermore, they find that a larger share of fee income over total income is positively and significantly associated with higher riskadjusted return on equity (ROE) and on total assets (ROA). However, for commercial banks they provide evidence that a strong involvement in fee-generating activities is associated with higher risk.
This paper contributes to the existing limited literature in several ways. First, combining bank-level and macroeconomic data, it studies the determinants of fees and commissions as a ratio to total assets and stresses this source of income at the international level while most of the related studies have investigated this issue at the country level. The international analysis is useful as it provides for a larger size of the panel and allows for assessing country-specific differences in fee and commission income dynamics. Second, it relies on a sound statistical technique (i.e. the Least Angle Regression procedure (LARS) developed by Efron, Hastie, Johnstone and Tibshirani (2004)) to select, out of a predetermined set of macroeconomic and financial factors, the determinants of fees and commissions over assets to be included in the benchmark model. The application of this selection strategy is particularly relevant because it reduces the degree of discretion in the choice of the key explanatory factors. This is similar in spirit to the approach by Kapinos and Mitnik (2016) , who employ the Least Absolut Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO), which is a constrained version of LARS, in a stress testing framework. Finally, our study hinges on four different econometric approaches to estimate the drivers of fees and commissions over assets and, thus, provides the necessary degree of robustness.
Our empirical strategy begins with the selection, out of a predetermined group of macroeconomic and financial factors 4 , of the independent variables that have the most explanatory power for fees and commission over assets. To this end, we exploit the LARS procedure developed by Efron et al. (2004) . Then, in a second stage, we estimate a benchmark model according to 4 different econometric methods: we employ a feasible generalised least square (FGLS) estimator, a fixed effects (FE) model, a system generalized methods of moment (GMM) estimator (Blundell and Bond 1998) and a bias-corrected least squares dummy variable (LSDVC) estimator as implemented by (Bruno 2005a,b) . The latter method represents our preferred approach since it corrects for dynamic panel bias, induced by the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable among the selected regressors, while still allowing for the explicit estimation of bank fixed effects.
Our benchmark estimates, using as explanatory variables the lag of the dependent variable, the stock market returns (both lagged and contemporaneous value), GDP growth, both the lag of the first difference of the short-term and long-term interest rates and the residential property price growth, show that the signs of the estimated coefficients are all as expected when significant and broadly in line with the previous literature. More specifically, our results show that lagged fee and commission income over assets, stock market returns and GDP growth are positively and significantly related to fees and commissions over assets, while the first difference of the short-term interest rate is negatively and significantly associated with our dependent variable.
The other variables are insignificant. Against this background, it is important to stress that the different econometric methods adopted yield qualitatively similar results. The results are also resilient to a set of robustness checks.
Finally, as a last step of our investigation, we conduct a scenario analysis. We use the estimated parameters to project fee and commission income over assets over a three-year horizon The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the dataset we use in our analysis. In Section 3, we present some descriptive information for the key variables of interest; Section 4 outlines the applied variable selection procedure. Section 5 reports the adopted econometric approaches, displays and discusses our main findings, and briefly describes the implemented battery of robustness checks. Section 6 illustrates the scenario analysis that we conduct according to both a baseline and an adverse scenario. A final section concludes.
Data
In this study, we use an unbalanced panel of annual data from 1995 to 2015 for a sample of banks which are mostly subject to the direct supervision of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and are established in all 19 euro area countries. 5 The banking data were extracted from Bloomberg. After excluding from the sample the banks for which less than 5 years of observations are available, the dataset includes 103 banks. 6 The most represented countries are Germany (20 banks), Italy (14 banks), Spain (12 banks) and France (10 banks). One country, namely Estonia, has only one banking institution in the sample. As expected, the coverage of banks tends to increase over time, i.e. the most recent years typically have the best coverage. 7 Table A.2 and Table A .3 provide the number of banks available in the sample respectively by country and by year.
The bank-specific variables included in our sample are both from banks' income statements and balance sheets. 8 In particular, from banks' income statements we obtain information about the variable of interest, i.e. fee and commission income. This item includes revenues earned from a range of activities, i.e. service charges, loan servicing fees, brokerage fees, trust fees and management fees. In this work, we only aim to model income from fees and commissions since it is the main component of the broader non-interest income class which comprises revenues from very heterogeneous activities. From banks' balance sheet, we extract information about total assets.
The dataset set used in this study also includes a series of macroeconomic and financial variables for the considered 19 euro area countries. 9 The set of explanatory variables was selected to reflect variables considered in the literature and also taking into account the need to include only variables that are projected in stress testing scenarios.
Finally, Table A .6 reports the main summary statistics of the used variables.
Some stylised facts
In the last decades, higher competition on traditional intermediation activities strengthened banks' incentives to develop non-interest income business activities. 10 Specifically, several studies have emphasised the relevance of fees and commissions as a source of revenue for banks. ECB (2010) and ECB (2013a) show that the mean ratio of net fee and commission income to total assets of a sample of large euro area banks was between 0.4% and 0.6% in the second half of the last decade. ECB (2013b) shows that the median ratio of net fee and commission income to total income for a sample of euro area significant banking groups has hovered between 20% and 25% in the last years. ECB (2013a) confirms this range but stresses that there is a large heterogeneity across euro area countries. In some countries like Finland, France and Italy, the share of fee and commission income over net income reaches levels of around 30%, whereas in countries like Greece or Ireland this ratio is closer to 15%.
As shown in Figure 1 , we observe a similar pattern of fees and commissions in our sample. Plot (a) shows that, in the last two decades, the median ratio of fee and commission income over total assets hovered between 0.6% and 1.2%. 11 Moreover, plot (b) shows that the median ratio of fees and commissions over net revenue remained rather stable between 22% and 30%.
Although this ratio is only half of that of net interest income over net revenue, it still indicates that fees and commissions are an important source of revenues for European banks. We also observe differences across countries. While this ratio lies between 20% and 30% for the bulk of the 19 countries in our sample, there are few countries either somewhat below the 20% mark (Belgium, Ireland, Malta, Netherlands) or above the 30% mark (Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Slovenia). Furthermore, plot (c) compares the evolution of fee and commission income over assets with that of net interest income over assets in our sample and shows that the former ratio has overall remained rather stable over the considered time period while the latter ratio has significantly decreased as a result of the general decline of the level of interest rates over the past decade and in light of the financial crisis. Only recently, net interest income has picked up again in a somewhat more benign financial environment. Moreover, it is also of interest to compare the evolution of fees and commission income over net revenue with that of net interest income over net revenue. As we can observe from plot (d), the median share of fees and commissions over net revenue, while relatively stable, has increased over the early years of our sample to peak around 2000. It then decreased slightly, but it still remains at a higher level than it was in the beginning of the sample period. In contrast, the share of net interest income has exhibited more variation over time. that banks with a larger coverage in terms of observations in our sample are also larger banks.
To take this fact into account we employ the ratio of fee and commission income to total assets for our empirical analysis.
Variable Selection: the Least Angle Regression procedure
As also suggested by some earlier studies surveyed in Section 1, there is a large set of candidate factors that may be associated with developments in the ratio of fee and commission income to total assets. In order to examine which variables are the most relevant in influencing fee and commission income over assets, we apply a variable selection procedure. More precisely, in the presence of many candidate variables, the objective is to choose as regressors those variables that have the most explanatory power for our variable of interest, while keeping the model relatively sparse to avoid over-fitting problems. The LASSO is a shrinkage and selection method for linear regressions which minimizes the residual sum of squares while imposing a bound on the sum of the absolute regression coefficients in the model thereby shrinking some coefficients towards zero. Stagewise follows a similar approach. However, in this case, the regression function is built successively. More precisely, the procedure starts with all the coefficients being at zero and then with small steps moves in the direction of the most correlated variables with the respective residual at each step.
The LARS approach, which derives its name from the underlying geometry, is also a stepwise procedure that implies equiangular movements towards a predictor variable which is as highly correlated with the residual as are the other variables already used in the prediction. 12 As explained by Efron et al. (2004) the LARS algorithm can also be employed to compute either a LASSO or a Stagewise solution. The results are very similar for these three approaches. 13 The LARS procedure also starts with the coefficients being zero and then increases the coefficient of the most highly correlated predictor x1 until the residual from the prediction is as highly correlated with a second predictor x2. At this point the algorithm proceeds, in contrast to the Stagewise procedure, in a direction equiangular between x1 and x2 until a third variables x3 is as highly correlated with the residual. Once more the algorithm moves in equiangular fashion towards these three predictors until a fourth variable x4 exhibits as high correlation with the residual and so on.
As explained above, the LARS algorithm allows selecting a subset of regressors from a predetermined larger set of variables and provides an order of inclusion reflecting the importance of each independent variable in explaining the variable of interest. In this analysis, the initial set of variables, to which the LARS algorithm is applied, comprises lagged fee and commission income over assets and both the contemporaneous value and the first lag of those macro-financial variables which are available for the scenario analysis, namely: stock market returns, the CPI inflation rate, real GDP growth, the first difference of the short-term rate, the first difference of the long-term rate and residential property price inflation. This set of variables is consistent with economic rationale and in line with the main factors discussed in the related literature.
While arguably also variables related to banks' financial market activity, such as brokerage and M&A financing could be relevant, in the model presented in this paper we rely on macro-financial factors as these are the variables which are typically included in stress test scenarios. Therefore, our variable set is largely determined by the list of variables available in the macro-financial scenarios used in the 2016 EU-wide stress test. Table 1 shows the results from our variable selection procedure. More specifically, Table 1 provides the order of inclusion, the C p statistic at each step for the resulting model as well The model implied by the minimum C p statistic includes seven out of the thirteen candidate variables. The variable set selected by the LARS approach comprises in decreasing order of inclusion: the lag of the fee and commission income to assets ratio, the lag of the first difference of the short-term interest rate, stock market returns (both the lag and the contemporaneous ECB Working Paper 2029, February 2017value), the lag of the first difference of the long-term interest rate, real GDP growth and residential property price inflation. These seven variables are included as regressors in our benchmark model.
Empirical strategy and results
In the following section, we first present the econometric methods used to estimate the relationship between the fee and commission income ratio to assets and the set of variables identified by the application of the LARS and then we report and comment the regression results. Finally, we perform a sequence of robustness checks to assess the stability and reliability of the results.
Econometric framework
Fee and commission income, like other sources of income, is driven both by the macro-financial environment and by bank-specific characteristics. However, the aim of this analysis is to shed more light on the relationship between the variables identified by the application of the LARS and the fee and commission income to asset variable for the banks in our sample. 14 To conduct this study, we apply different panel econometric methods. First, we use a FGLS estimator corrected for heteroskedasticity to estimate the following model:
where y i,t is the variable of interest (i.e. fee and commission income to total assets) for each individual bank i at time t. Fee and commission income is scaled by total assets to account for the different size of banks in the sample. The relative average stability and persistency 15 of the fee and commission income-to-total asset ratio over time suggests that the lag of the ratio might be a strong predictor of its contemporaneous value. Therefore, equation 1 features as explanatory factor y i,t−1 , i.e. the lagged dependent variable. Finally, X t is a [1xj] vector and represents the j explanatory variables 16 selected applying the LARS and i,t is the zero-mean bank-specific error term.
In the second econometric approach, we estimate a fixed effects (FE) model to account for bank-specific unobserved factors that might drive individual banks results. Estimating a FE 14 This investigation focuses particularly on the role played by macroeconomic and financial factors as these variables are generally included in macroeconomic scenarios used for stress test purposes. However, bank-specific factors are also considered as part of our robustness analysis. 15 In this context, a unit root hypothesis can be rejected. Results based on Fisher-type tests (Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron) are available from the authors upon request. 16 As we employ a European sample, where differences in the macroeconomic environment of individual countries exist, we use country-specific macro variables. However, a possible caveat of this approach is the fact that banks are exposed not only to the domestic economy, but through foreign operations also to macroeconomic conditions elsewhere. It could thus be worthwhile to construct bank-specific macroeconomic indicators reflecting each bank's exposure to other countries; although data availability prevents us from pursuing this approach. model implies assuming the existence of time-invariant bank-specific effects that are potentially correlated with the individual regressors unlike in a random-effects model. In this context, we estimate the following equation:
where α i are the bank-specific fixed effects. The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in a panel framework might yield biased and inconsistent estimates due to the correlation between the lagged dependent variables and the error terms (Nickell 1981) and (Kiviet 1995) , so called dynamic panel bias. To address this issue, we make use of two other estimation strategies.
First, as shown in equation 3, we employ a system GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond 1998) that combines the original equation in levels and an equation in differences
This estimator is designed for estimating models with a dynamic regressor and with inde- it is also potentially more efficient than the GMM estimator 17 , and it allows for the explicit estimation of bank-specific fixed effects. However, it is relevant to highlight that the LSDVC estimator is designed for estimating models with strictly exogenous independent variables. We employ this approach as implemented by Bruno (2005b) , i.e. initialising the bias correction with the Blundell-Bond (system GMM) estimator. 18 To ensure that the estimated asymptotic standard errors of the LSDVC estimator yield reliable t-statistics, statistical inference for the coefficients is based on bootstrapped standard errors (50 iterations) (Bruno 2005b).
Regression results
Our analysis has two main objectives: first, it aims at examining in more depth the relationship between the fee and commission income ratio and the set of variables identified by the application of the LARS; second, it strives to develop a model that can be used for scenario analysis in a stress testing context. In this regard, the estimated parameters can be used to project the fee and commission income ratio into the future taking as input the macroeconomic projections from a specific scenario. Table 2 shows the regression results based on the variable set selected by the LARS: the lag of the fee and commission income to assets ratio, the lag of the first difference of the short-term interest rate, stock market returns (both the lag and the contemporaneous value), the lag of the first difference of the long-term interest rate, real GDP growth and residential property price inflation. More specifically, Table 2 The models generally yield qualitatively similar results. In particular, the latter three models imply both similar coefficients and significance levels. 19 More precisely, for these three models the selected macro-financial variables which are significant comprise the lag of the first difference of the short-term rate, stock market returns and real GDP growth. Moreover, the explanatory The scale of the estimated coefficients can be interpreted in the following way: one additional percentage point of real GDP growth would lead, ceteris paribus, to an increase in the average fee and commission income ratio to total assets of about 1% given an average fee and commission income ratio in our sample of 0.79%. 0.11 Number of instruments 10 ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Parameter estimates based on the feasible GLS approach (FGLS), equation 1, the fixed effects approach (FE) and the LSDVC approach (LSDVC), both equation 2, and system GMM (GMM), equation 3, are shown. z-statistics (t-statistic in the FE case) based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis. Below the parameter estimates the number of observations and the number of individual banking groups in the sample are provided. Further, the Wald χ 2 statistic (F -statistic in the case of FE model) to test for the joint significance of the estimated parameters is given. Finally, for the GMM approach the p-value based on the Arellano-Bond statistic to test for second-order autocorrelation and on the Hansen J statistic to test the validity of the overidentifying restrictions, respectively, is shown. Further, in this case the lagged dependent variable is instrumented with its own lags (collapsed), the exogenous variables in the model and the time dummies.
The test results included for the GMM approach indicate the validity of the instruments used, as the over-identifying restrictions are fulfilled, and further show the absence of secondorder autocorrelation in the residuals when using this estimator. 20 20 Results for the FGLS model stand out in yielding a much higher autocorrelation coefficient of 0.98. This can be explained by the absence of any fixed effects in the model. In this model also the other macro-financial variables have significant coefficients (in particular lagged stock market returns and residential property price growth), while the coefficient on real GDP growth is not significant. Given the before mentioned caveats of this model, we deem these results less reliable.
Robustness checks
We perform a sequence of robustness checks to ensure the stability and reliability of the results of our preferred model which relies on the LSDVC estimator; the results of which are shown in Table 3 . 1760*** 1516*** 1373*** 2476*** ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Parameter estimates for equation 2 based on the LSDVC approach are shown. z-statistics based on heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis. Below the parameter estimates, the number of observations and the number of individual banking groups in the sample are provided. Further, the Wald χ 2 statistic to test for the joint significance of the estimated parameters is given.
We begin with removing those variables that are insignificant in the LSDVC model. In particular, these are lagged stock market returns, the lag of the first difference of the long-term interest rate and residential property price inflation. The results shown in column (1 ) confirm the robustness of the results which are hardly changed in terms of the significance and the value of coefficients of those variables left in the model. A further robustness check consists of including additional control variables in the LSDVC benchmark model. More specifically, we enhance the model with either the lag or the contemporaneous value of CPI inflation, as the variable is the only that has not been picked in either form by the LARS algorithm. As shown in columns (2 ) and (3 ) in Table 3 , the main results of the analysis are robust to the inclusion of these additional controls. Indeed, the variables, which were included in the benchmark model in Finally, we test the robustness of our benchmark results by limiting the sample to only those banks with a value of total assets larger than or equal to 50 billion which roughly halves the sample. As shown, in column (4 ) in Table 3 , the main results of the analysis do not change on a qualitative basis. The main difference consists of a somewhat higher autocorrelation coefficient and slightly smaller coefficients on the macro-financial variables with the coefficient on stock market returns being on a lower significance level.
Scenario analysis
In this section, a scenario analysis of fee and commission income over total assets under both a baseline and an adverse scenario for a three-year horizon between end-2015 and end-2018 for 18 euro area countries is conducted. 22 The projections of fee and commission income over total assets are computed feeding the macroeconomic scenarios through the estimated benchmark LSDVC model (presented in column (4 ) in Table 2) In this context, it is key to emphasize that the exercise presented in this section is not a 21 We also assessed the impact of including in the estimated model bank-specific variables reflecting on the bank business model, namely the retail ratio and the leverage ratio. In both cases, the coefficients of the benchmark variables did not change substantially such that there does not seem to be an omitted variable bias problem related to these indicators. It is worth noting that the estimated coefficient for the retail ratio is positive and significant. This seems to suggest that more traditional banks on average have a higher fee and commission income to total assets ratio. The coefficient on the leverage ratio is negative and significant indicating that more leveraged banks on average have lower fee and comission income. Results are available upon request. 22 No projections for Lithuania are included, as there are no data points for fee and commission income for the respective banks at the end of the sample, i.e. for 2014 and 2015. Figure A.5 also reports the decomposition of the contribution of the explanatory factors to 24 In particular, the cumulative deviation between the adverse and baseline country level projections over the stress test horizon is 43 the average adverse-baseline deviation of banks' fee and commission income over the stress test horizon. The figure shows that in the first year of the stress test horizon real GDP growth and the stock market returns are the largest contributors to the deviation. In the second year and particularly in the third year, the role of these two factors declines due to the increasing effect of the lag term of the dependent variable.
Overall, these findings point to the potential for seriously misrepresenting the sensitivity of fee and commission income to macro-financial shocks when conducting bank stress tests where this material income item is treated as independent from the macro scenario. Hence, explicitly modelling fee and commission income as advertised in this study appears to be a promising approach for future bank stress tests.
Conclusions
In this paper, we present an empirical macro-financial model for the estimation of fee and commission income (as a ratio of total assets) for a broad sample of euro area banks.
In particular, in this analysis, we first employ a variable-selection technique (LARS) to determine the set of relevant regressors for our variable of interest.
Then, using different panel econometric techniques, we find that fee and commission income over assets is varying with the economic and financial cycle. Specifically, it is significantly related to real GDP growth, the lag of the short-term interest rate, stock market returns and its own lag. These results are qualitatively consistent across all the econometric approaches applied.
Finally, as a last step of our study, we conduct a scenario analysis. We use the estimated parameters to project fee and commission income over assets over a three-year horizon conditional on both a baseline and an adverse financial and macroeconomic scenario. This scenario analysis illustrates how fees and commissions are sensitive to the different macroeconomic developments.
The resulting fee and commission projections aggregated at country level are considerably more conservative under the adverse scenario than under the baseline scenario. Moreover, for the majority of the countries, the projected fee and commission income ratios feature an overall decline with respect to the cut-off level under the adverse scenario.
These findings suggest that stress tests assuming scenario-independent fee and commission income projections are likely to be flawed. According to the results presented in this paper, it is plausible that fee and commission income will differ depending on the macro-financial environment and, ignoring this, presumably would lead to a misrepresentation of banking-sector soundness and resilience to shocks. 
